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FROM ROWLEY TO ENDREW F.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1982, the United States Supreme Court established the standard for school
districts to provide a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to students with
disabilities as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).1
In Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme Court ruled that in order to meet the
FAPE requirement, school districts were required to provide students with disabilities
an “educational benefit.”2 Thirty-five years later, in Endrew F. v. Douglas County
School District RE-1, the Court revisited Rowley and stated that in order to provide a
FAPE to children with disabilities, school districts must provide an educational
program that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate
in light of the child’s circumstances.”3
Even though Endrew F. articulated a new FAPE standard, the Court emphasized
that it was not overruling Rowley.4 The Court also took steps to narrow its decision.
It warned that its new FAPE standard was not an “invitation” to courts to abandon
the deference the Court gave to state educators in Rowley.5 It also reaffirmed Rowley’s
ruling that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide equal educational
opportunities to children with disabilities.6
The Supreme Court’s adoption of a new FAPE standard combined with its
cautionary words about Rowley left several questions about Endrew F.’s impact.
Primary among them was how the lower courts would interpret its FAPE standard.
Did Endrew F. replace Rowley’s FAPE standard or just restate it? Did Endrew F. set
a higher FAPE standard than Rowley? Despite the Supreme Court’s denial, did
Endrew F. open the door for courts to construe the IDEA to provide equal educational
opportunity for students with disabilities? This article examines Endrew F.’s impact
by tracing the evolution of FAPE standards among the courts and answers all three
questions in the affirmative: 1) Endrew F.’s FAPE standard replaced Rowley; 2) it
strengthened the FAPE standard in a majority of the circuits; and 3) it left the door
open for the courts to construe the IDEA as requiring equal educational opportunities
for children with disabilities.
Part II of this article provides a brief overview of the IDEA’s essential elements,
including its definition of a FAPE. Part III examines how the Supreme Court
defined a FAPE in Rowley. Part IV explains the various FAPE standards the circuit
courts implemented after Rowley. Part V focuses on Endrew F., in which the Court
explicitly rejected the lowest of these standards and adopted one that appears to be
1.

See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982); see also Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–82 (2017) (codifying FAPE at § 1412(a)(1)).

2.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200–01.

3.

137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).

4.

See id. at 998–99, 1001 (“Mindful that Congress . . . has not materially changed the statutory definition
of a FAPE since Rowley was decided, we decline to interpret the FAPE provision in a manner so plainly
at odds with the Court’s analysis in that case.”).

5.

Id. at 1001.

6.

Id.
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higher than all of the circuit courts except one. Part VI documents how the lower
courts have implemented Endrew F. Finally, Part VII explores whether Endrew F.
could lead the courts to adopt the equal opportunity standard that the Court rejected
nearly forty years ago.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE IDEA

A brief review of the IDEA helps to place the FAPE requirement in context.
This review includes the IDEA’s background, its federalist structure, its procedural
requirements, the statutory definition of a FAPE, the least restrictive environment
requirement, and the IDEA’s remedial options.
A. The IDEA’s Background

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,7 a
movement to create a right to education for children with disabilities was born. The
movement documented legally sanctioned discriminatory practices by school districts
that resulted in millions of children with disabilities being shut out from school and
millions of others warehoused in unsuitable classrooms where they did not receive
any education.8 Congress passed the IDEA to ensure that children with disabilities
received an appropriate education.9
B. The Federalist Structure of the IDEA

The IDEA provides federal funds to states to assist them in providing education
to children with disabilities.10 In return, the IDEA requires states to comply with the
IDEA’s requirements for educating those children, including providing a FAPE.11
The states generally distribute these funds to local school districts, which are directly
responsible for meeting the educational needs of children with disabilities.12 Courts
have cited the Spending Clause13 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement
Clause14 as the sources of congressional authority to pass and enforce the IDEA.15
7.

347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (deciding that segregation in schools based on race deprived students of equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).

8.

See Deborah N. Archer & Richard D. Marsico, Special Education Law and Practice: Cases
and Materials 11 (2017).

9.

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2017).

10.

Id. § 1411(a)(1); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982).

11.

Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993; see § 1412(a)(1).

12.

See B.J.S. v. State Educ. Dep’t, 699 F. Supp. 2d 586, 599–600 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (ruling that local school
districts, not states, have the responsibility to provide a FAPE to children with disabilities).

13.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

14.

Id. amend. XIV, § 5.

15.

See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295 (2006) (“Congress enacted
the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause.”); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 n.1 (1989)
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C. The IDEA’s Procedural Requirements

The IDEA’s procedural requirements are extensive, taking up a significantly
larger portion of the statute than its educational requirements. The IDEA requires
school districts to identify and evaluate children16 to determine whether they have
one of eleven enumerated disabilities and, by reason of the disability, need special
education and related services.17 If a child is eligible for special education, the school
district must create a written individualized education program (IEP) for the child.18
The IEP is prepared by a team that includes administrators, teachers, and the
student’s parents.19 It contains a description of the student’s disability, their level of
academic achievement, annual goals, a description of how their goals will be
measured, and the special education and related services the student will receive. 20
The IDEA creates an administrative structure for filing complaints and allows
judicial review of the administrative process. Any party may submit a complaint to the
relevant school district regarding the “identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such
child.” 21 The school district must provide the opportunity for an impartial
administrative hearing to any party that files a complaint.22 Any party aggrieved by
the administrative process can file a complaint in court.23 The reviewing court will
“receive the record of the administrative proceedings,” accept “additional evidence at
the request of a party,” and “bas[e] its decision on the preponderance of the evidence.”24
D. The IDEA’s Definition of a FAPE

The IDEA defines a FAPE as “special education and related services that . . . are
provided in conformity with the [child’s] individualized education program . . . .”25
“Special education” is “specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet
(assuming without deciding that Congress passed the IDEA pursuant to its authority under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
16.

§ 1412(a)(3)(A).

17.

§ 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii). The enumerated disabilities are “intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments . . .,
speech or language impairments, visual impairments . . ., serious emotional disturbance . . ., orthopedic
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairment, or specific learning disabilities . . . .”
§ 1401(3)(A)(i).

18.

§§ 1414(d), 1401(14).

19.

§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)–(vii).

20. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(VIII).
21.

§ 1415(b)(6)(A).

22.

§ 1415(f)(1)(A).

23.

§ 1415(i)(2)(A). A civil suit “may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district
court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.” Id.

24.

§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(i)–(iii).

25.

§ 1401(9).
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the unique needs of a child with a disability . . . .” 26 Related services include
“developmental, corrective, and other supportive services . . . as may be required to
assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education . . . .”27 Thus, to
provide a FAPE, a school district must prepare an IEP that meets a child’s educational
needs and allows the child to benefit from that education. However, the IDEA does
not define two of the key phrases in this definition: “meets” and “benefit.”
E. The Least Restrictive Environment

The IDEA requires school districts to educate students with disabilities in what
is known as the “least restrictive environment” (LRE). This means that:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are
educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 28

The circuit courts have established different tests for determining whether a school
district has satisfied the LRE requirement. These tests generally require a flexible,
child-focused analysis to determine whether adequate education in the general
education classroom can be achieved by using educational supports, and if not, whether
the school has maximized the child’s participation in other mainstream activities.29
F. Remedies

In civil cases, the IDEA gives judges broad authority to “grant such relief as the
court deems is appropriate.”30 Courts have generally concluded that this provision
does not allow judges to award monetary damages for IDEA violations.31 Instead,
the two primary forms of relief in IDEA cases are equitable in nature: reimbursement
to parents who placed their child in a private school because the district school was

26. § 1401(29).
27.

§ 1401(26)(A).

28. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
29. See, e.g., P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2008). The term “mainstream” has

become common parlance for the LRE requirement. See id. at 119 (“Educating a handicapped child in a
regular education classroom . . . is familiarly known as ‘mainstreaming.’”) (quoting Daniel R.R. v. State
Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1989)).

30. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
31.

See Archer & Marsico, supra note 8, at 647–49 (discussing the treatment of the IDEA provision by
various federal circuit courts).
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not providing a FAPE,32 and compensatory education for services the school district
did not provide to the child.33
III. BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ROWLEY

In 1982, the Supreme Court issued Board of Education v. Rowley, its first decision
about the meaning of a FAPE—indeed, its first decision about the IDEA.34 Rowley
set the standard for providing a FAPE that would last for thirty-five years.
A. The Majority Decision
		 1. Facts

Amy Rowley was a deaf elementary school student at Furnace Woods Elementary
School in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District in Peekskill, New York.35
Even though Amy’s academic performance was better than average and she had
advanced from grade to grade, she understood “considerably less” in class than if she
were not deaf, and as a result, was not meeting her full potential.36
The school district prepared an IEP for Amy that provided that she would be
educated in a regular education classroom, use an FM hearing device, and receive
instruction from a tutor for deaf people one hour per day and speech therapy three
hours per week.37 Amy’s parents disagreed with this IEP and asked the district to
provide her with a sign-language interpreter in all of her academic classes in place of
some of the other services, but the district refused.38
Amy’s parents requested an impartial hearing to challenge the district’s decision.
They claimed that the district’s failure to provide Amy with a sign-language
interpreter denied her a FAPE. 39 They lost the impartial hearing and the
administrative appeal, but after challenging the administrative decision in federal
court, they prevailed—both in the district court and on appeal.40 The district court
32.

See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (finding that the Education
of the Handicapped Act—the former name of the IDEA—authorized courts to order public school
authorities to reimburse parents for expenditures on private special education).

33.

See Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753–54 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[I]mposing liability for compensatory
educational services . . . is necessary to secure the child’s right to a free appropriate public education.”);
Archer & Marsico, supra note 8, at 671. Compensatory education is a remedy intended to “place
disabled children in the same position they would have occupied but for the school district’s violations
of IDEA, by providing the educational services children should have received in the first instance.”
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted).

34. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
35.

Id. at 184.

36. Id. at 185.
37.

Id. at 184.

38. Id.
39.

Id. at 185.

40. Id. at 185–86.
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ruled, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that the IDEA required Amy’s school
district to provide Amy with the “opportunity to achieve [her] full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.”41 The district court
suggested a test to determine whether a school district meets this standard: 1)
Measure the student’s potential; 2) compare the student’s performance with their
potential and determine if there is a shortfall; and 3) compare any shortfall with that
of typically developing children.42 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the meaning of a FAPE under the IDEA.43
		

2. The Supreme Court’s Definition of a FAPE

The Court, in an opinion by Justice William Rehnquist, rejected the district
court’s definition of a FAPE, stating that the district court developed it without
reference to the IDEA’s language or its legislative history.44 The Court also rejected
the Rowleys’ argument that the IDEA requires school districts to provide students
with disabilities “an equal educational opportunity” as an “entirely unworkable
standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons.”45 The Court
formulated its own definition of a FAPE, but did so in six different ways over the
course of its opinion:
One: School districts must provide students with disabilities meaningful
access to education.46

Two: School districts must give students with disabilities access to special
education.47
Three: The IDEA provides a basic f loor of opportunity to students with
disabilities.48

Four: School districts must provide some educational benefit to students with
disabilities.49

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 186.

43.

Id.

44. Id. at 189–90.
45.

Id. at 198.

46. Id. at 192 (“[I]n seeking to provide such access to public education, Congress did not impose upon the

States any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make such access
meaningful.”).

47.

Id. at 200 (“Congress sought primarily to identify and evaluate handicapped children, and to provide
them with access to a free public education.”).

48. Id. at 201 (“[T]he basic f loor of opportunity provided by the Act consists of access to specialized

instruction and related services . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).

49. Id. at 200 (“Implicit in the congressional purpose . . . is the requirement that the education to which

access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.”).
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Five: School districts must provide “access to specialized instruction and
related services which are individually designed to provide educational
benefit” to students with disabilities.50

Six: School districts must provide “personalized instruction with sufficient
support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that
instruction.”51

These six standards can be organized into four different categories based on the
amount of education a school district must apparently provide in order to comply
with the requirements of a FAPE, from more to less:
Level of Benefit

Formulation

Meaningful access

Formulation One

Some educational benefit

Formulation Four

Educational benefit

Formulations Five and Six

Access to education

Formulations Two and Three

Thus, Rowley’s various FAPE standards can be seen as requiring school districts
to provide students with disabilities access to education, some educational benefit,
educational benefit, or meaningful access to education.52
		

3. The Court’s Application of the FAPE Test

Having defined a FAPE, even imperfectly, the Court declined to adopt a single
test for determining whether a school district provided a FAPE. Instead, it limited
its ruling to the facts before it—a child with a disability “who is receiving substantial
specialized education and related services, and who is performing above average in
the regular classrooms of a public school system . . . .”53 The Court stated that a child
in these circumstances is receiving a FAPE if the child’s IEP is “reasonably calculated
to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”54 The
Court found that the school district was providing educational services to Amy that
were calculated to meet her needs and the lower courts were wrong to conclude that
the IDEA required the school district to provide her with a sign-language
interpreter.55 Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit.56
50. Id. at 201.
51.

Id. at 203.

52.

This chart and the two that follow in this article admittedly lack scientific or mathematical precision.
They are based on informed judgments about open-ended and often inconsistent language that describes
legal standards. Although they lack precision, the charts support broad conclusions. Here, the conclusion
is that Rowley suggests more than one FAPE standard, and these standards are markedly different.

53.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.

54. Id. at 204.
55.

See id. at 210.

56. Id.

36
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B. Concurring Opinion

Justice Harry Blackmun concurred in the judgment. Based on his reading of the
IDEA’s legislative history and the intent of Congress, Justice Blackmun suggested a
FAPE standard similar to what the district court articulated and the Rowleys
pursued: “whether [the child’s] program, viewed as a whole, offered her an opportunity
to understand and participate in the classroom that was substantially equal” to the
one afforded her typically developing classmates.57 Justice Blackmun concluded that
the school district satisfied this standard for Amy.58
C. Dissenting Opinion

Justice Byron White, joined by Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall, dissented. Justice White analyzed the IDEA’s legislative history and
concluded that it demonstrated a congressional intent to provide far more education
to children with disabilities than the majority’s standard.59 Justice White identified
terms in the IDEA’s legislative history describing the education that Congress
intended, including “full educational opportunity,” “equal educational opportunity,”
and “maximum potential.”60 Based on the legislative history, Justice White concluded
that the IDEA requires that children with disabilities be given an equal opportunity
to learn.61 Since Amy understood less than half of what happened in the classroom,
he found that she did not have an equal opportunity to learn and thus was deprived
of a FAPE.62
IV. CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF ROWLEY

Given Rowley’s various FAPE formulations, the circuit courts had discretion in
deciding which FAPE standard to adopt. Not surprisingly, courts in all but the Sixth
Circuit—the only one to articulate the standard in light of the child’s potential—
adopted standards that fell within Rowley’s various categories. The standard for each
circuit is described below:
District of Columbia Circuit: The D.C. Circuit utilized the “some educational
benefit” standard.63

57.

Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).

58. Id. at 212.
59.

Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting).

60. Id. at 213–14.
61.

Id. at 215.

62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Rowley standard

requires only that schools provide ‘some educational benefit’ . . . .”) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200);
Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

37

FROM ROWLEY TO ENDREW F.

First Circuit: Appeals courts in the First Circuit phrased the FAPE standard
somewhat differently. Some courts required a meaningful educational
benefit.64 Others required some educational benefit.65

Second Circuit: Appeals courts in the Second Circuit also phrased the FAPE
standard differently. Cases differed on whether they defined the FAPE
standard as requiring meaningful access or a benefit.66
Third Circuit: The Third Circuit required school districts to provide a
significant and meaningful benefit.67

Fourth Circuit: The Fourth Circuit required school districts to provide
meaningful education to children with disabilities, which it defined as “more
than minimal, trivial progress.”68

Fifth Circuit: The Fifth Circuit’s position was that the IDEA does not
require states to provide the best education, but that the IDEA’s basic floor of
opportunity means that the child’s IEP must be likely to allow the child to
progress and not regress, and that the progress must be meaningful, meaning
more than trivial.69
Sixth Circuit: The Sixth Circuit, the only one to exceed the standards
articulated by Rowley, held that an IEP must provide “a meaningful educational

64. See, e.g., Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2012); D.B. v. Esposito,

675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Hence, to comply with the IDEA, an IEP must be reasonably
calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit.”).

65.

Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2008) (“An IEP need
only supply ‘some educational benefit,’ not an optimal or ideal level of educational benefit, in order to
survive judicial scrutiny.”).

66. Compare T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 160 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To decide whether an

IEP complies with the IDEA . . . [it must be asked] whether it was ‘reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits.’”), with M.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 143 (2d Cir.
2013) (“[T]he door of public education must be opened in a meaningful way. That is, . . . [it] must
provide the opportunity for more than only trivial advancement.”), and Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 133 (2d Cir. 1998) (“IDEA requires states to provide a disabled child with
meaningful access to an education, but it cannot guarantee totally successful results.”).

67.

See, e.g., Coleman v. Pottstown Sch. Dist., 581 F. App’x 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[A] school district . . .
must supply an education that provides significant learning and meaningful benefit to the child.”)
(internal quotations omitted); Mary Courtney T. v. Sch. Dist., 575 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2009); Shore
Reg’l High Sch. Bd. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate
Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 183–84 (3d Cir. 1998).

68. O.S. v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 804 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Using [the term] ‘meaningful’ [is]

simply another way to characterize the requirement that an [IEP] must provide a child with more than
minimal, trivial progress.”); see also Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985)
(“Clearly, Congress did not intend that a school system could discharge its duty under the [IDEA] by
providing a program that produces some minimal academic achievement, no matter how trivial.”).

69. R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F.3d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The FAPE required by

the IDEA ‘need not be the best possible one, . . . [but] must be likely to produce progress, not regression
or trivial educational advancement.’”); Adam J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 808–09 (5th
Cir. 2003); Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 247–48 (5th Cir. 1997).

38
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benefit gauged in relation to the potential of the child at issue. . . . Accordingly, an
IEP is insufficient if it provides ‘only trivial educational benefit.’”70

Seventh Circuit: In the Seventh Circuit, school districts were required to
provide educational benefit, defined as more than just trivial progress.71
Eighth Circuit: The Eighth Circuit utilized both “some educational benefit”
and “slight or de minimis” FAPE standards.72
Ninth Circuit: The Ninth Circuit utilized the educational benefit standard.73

Tenth Circuit: The Tenth Circuit interpreted “some educational benefit” to
mean merely “more than de minimis.” 74

Eleventh Circuit: The Eleventh Circuit referred to Rowley’s FAPE standard
as the “basic floor of opportunity standard.” 75 Under this standard, school
districts are not required to maximize educational benefits, but must provide
some educational benefit measured by the child’s individual needs.76

The chart below links each circuit’s FAPE standard to the corresponding Rowley
standard based on the level of educational benefit each circuit interpreted the FAPE
standard to require. If a circuit has adopted two standards, it is placed in the higher
of the two groups:
FAPE Standard

Meaningful benefit in light of the child’s potential

Sixth

Benefit

Ninth

Meaningful benefit/access

Some/more than trivial benefit

Circuits

First, Second, Third, and Fifth
District of Columbia, Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh

70. Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 F. App’x 968, 974–75 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added); Deal v.

Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004).

71.

M.B. v. Hamilton Se. Sch., 668 F.3d 851, 862 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n IEP . . . enable[s] the child to
receive an educational benefit ‘when it is likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial educational
advancement.’”) (quoting Alex R. v. Forestville Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 221, 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th
Cir. 2004)).

72. Compare M.M. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch., 702 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he IEP must provide some

educational benefit . . . .”) (quoting Park Hill Sch. Dist. v. Dass, 655 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2011)), with
K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 647 F.3d 795, 810 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding no IDEA violation when the
child “enjoyed more than what we would consider slight or ‘de minimis’ academic progress”).

73. See S.W. v. Governing Bd. of E. Whittier City Sch. Dist., 504 F. App’x 571, 572 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding

that IDEA requirements were met when the student’s IEP provided the child “with educational
benefit”); K.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 426 F. App’x 536, 537–38 (9th Cir. 2011); J.L. v. Mercer
Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2010).

74.

See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ‘some
educational benefit’ language in defining a [FAPE] . . . mean[s] that the educational benefit mandated
by the IDEA must merely be ‘more than de minimis.’”), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).

75. Phyllene W. v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 630 F. App’x 917, 920 (11th Cir. 2015).
76. Id.
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With the exception of the Sixth Circuit, every circuit adopted a FAPE standard that
correlated with one of Rowley’s standards. The Sixth Circuit’s additional component—
that the education be meaningful in light of the child’s potential—foreshadows the
Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F.
V. ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Thirty-five years after Rowley, the Supreme Court revisited the question of how
much education a school district must provide to a student with a disability in order
to provide a FAPE. In answering this question, it replaced Rowley’s various
educational benefit standards with one that requires school districts to design an IEP
that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light
of the child’s circumstances.”77
A. Facts

Endrew F. involved a child who was diagnosed with autism at age two.78 By the
time Endrew reached fourth grade, his parents felt that his progress had stalled; his
IEPs were basically the same from year to year.79 After the school district again
offered Endrew the same IEP for fifth grade, his parents removed him from the
public school and placed him in a private school for children with autism.80 Endrew’s
behavior and academic performance improved at his new school.81
Endrew’s parents filed an administrative complaint seeking reimbursement from
the school district for the tuition they paid to the private school.82 They lost at the
administrative level, the district court, and the Tenth Circuit: Applying its merely
more than de minimis standard, the court of appeals found that the school district
had not denied Endrew a FAPE.83
B. The Supreme Court’s Definition of a FAPE

The Court in Endrew F. noted that Rowley did not adopt a single standard for
evaluating whether a school district had provided a FAPE to a child with a disability.84
It then stated, however, that the IDEA and Rowley “point to a general approach: To
meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the
77.

Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).

78. Id. at 996.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81.

Id. at 996–97.

82. Id. at 997.
83. Id. at 991.
84. Id. at 993, 997–99.
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child’s circumstances.”85 The Court then elaborated on the key elements of its new
FAPE standard: 1) reasonably calculated; 2) progress; 3) appropriate; and 4) in light
of the child’s circumstances.
The Court explained that “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress” reflects the concept that the IEP is prospective based on the educational
expertise of school officials and input from parents; although it need not be ideal, an
IEP must be reasonable in light of the child’s circumstances.86 The Court further
explained that “progress” is part of the FAPE standard because the role of the IEP is
to create a program that will help the child to advance academically and functionally.87
In defining “appropriate progress,” the Court explained that for a child “fully
integrated in the regular classroom,” the IEP “typically” should allow the child to
pass his courses and advance to the next grade.88 For children not reasonably expected
to advance from grade to grade, the IEP is not required to enable the child to do so,
but “the educational program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his
circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious
for most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every child
should have the chance to meet challenging objectives.”89 The need to view all of this
through the prism of the “child’s circumstances” is grounded in the IDEA’s
requirement that the special education the district provides be specifically tailored to
the child’s needs, that the child’s educational program be individualized, and that
schools educate children with a wide range of needs.90
The Court stopped short of describing what an “appropriate” education would
look like on a case-by-case basis since the appropriateness of an IEP “turns on the
unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created.”91 The Court rejected
Endrew’s parents’ argument that the FAPE standard should require districts to
provide students with disabilities an equivalent opportunity to achieve academically.92
That standard, the Court pointed out, is similar to what the district court in Rowley
adopted and virtually identical to Justice Blackmun’s standard in his concurring
opinion.93 Noting that Congress had not made a statutory change to the definition of
a FAPE since Rowley, the Court declined to interpret the IDEA in a way that the
majority of the Court in Rowley rejected.94
85. Id. at 999.
86. Id.
87.

Id.

88. Id.
89. Id. at 1000.
90. Id.
91.

Id. at 1001.

92.

Id. at 992.

93.

Id. at 1001.

94. Id.
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VI. THE LOWER COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF ENDREW F.

Several circuit courts have addressed Endrew F. and its impact on their FAPE
standards. This Part describes these courts’ responses to Endrew F.95
A. District of Columbia Circuit

In Z.B. v. District of Columbia, the court stated that Endrew F. “raised the bar on
what counts as an adequate education under the IDEA.”96 The court then replaced its
previous “some educational benefits” standard with Endrew F.’s standard: The IEP
must be “reasonably calculated to make progress in light of the child’s circumstances.”97
B. First Circuit

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has not yet considered Endrew F., but a
district court in the First Circuit has shed light on its significance. In C.D. v. Natick
Public School District, the district court’s review of the administrative finding was
pending when Endrew F. was decided.98 Noting the First Circuit’s previous “some
educational benefit” standard, and that the hearing officer stated that an IEP must be
“designed to meet the child’s unique needs” and be “reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefit,” the court remanded the case to the hearing officer
with instructions to determine whether its standard was consistent with Endrew F.,
and if not, to consider the case under the appropriate standard.99
C. Second Circuit

The Second Circuit announced its position on Endrew F. in P. v. West Hartford
Board of Education.100 The court stated that the FAPE standard it had adopted in its
prior decisions was consistent with Endrew F.’s standard.101 One of the decisions it
cited, A.M. v. New York City Department of Education, used the “educational benefits”
standard.102 The other, Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, stated that the

95. The various standards described in this section are based on decisions that were published as of October

1, 2018.

96. 888 F.3d 515, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
97.

Id. (quoting Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999); see also Middleton v. District of Columbia, 312 F. Supp. 3d
113, 121 (D.D.C. 2018); Pavelko v. District of Columbia, 288 F. Supp. 3d 301, 307–08 (D.D.C. 2018).

98. No. 15-13617-FDS, 2017 WL 2483551, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2017).
99. Id. at *1–2 (quoting Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 23–24 (1st Cir.

2008)); but see Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2012) (adopting
the meaningful benefit standard); D.B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012) (adopting the
meaningful benefit standard).

100. 885 F.3d 735, 756–57 (2d Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 322 (2018).
101. Id. at 757.
102. See 845 F.3d 523, 541 (2d Cir. 2017).

42

VOLUME 63 | 2018/19

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

education must be “meaningful.”103 The court then affirmed the decision of the
district court that the school had provided the child with a FAPE because it provided
him with a “meaningful educational program that was reasonably calculated to
enable P. to make progress appropriate in light of his circumstances.”104 In using
Endrew F.’s standard to determine that the school district had provided the child
with a FAPE, the court apparently equated its “meaningful” standard with
“appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”
D. Third Circuit

Although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not addressed Endrew
F., district courts in the Third Circuit have been busy doing so. In Montgomery
County Intermediate Unit No. 23 v. C.M.,105 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania took
an approach similar to the Second Circuit’s. The court held that the Third Circuit’s
“meaningful benefit” standard was similar to Endrew F.; thus the hearing officer’s
FAPE standard that the IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual potential”
was proper.106 Another court created a test to implement Endrew F.: A school district
must identify the child’s intellectual potential, evaluate the child’s educational needs,
and implement a curriculum that produces reasonable progress in light of those
needs.107 One decision’s analysis provides a roadmap for implementing Endrew F.’s
appropriate progress test and is worth quoting in detail:
Significantly, the factual record is preponderant that Student “failed to
progress academically at more than a snail’s pace.” In fact, Student’s progress
was so incremental there was no reasonable basis to believe that Student could
reach or accomplish IEP goals within a yearly term. Student’s bench-mark
scores well below grade expectations and the incremental progress reports on
IEP goals further support the finding that Student was not receiving a
meaningful education, was not making satisfactory progress, and was in fact
falling behind his age and grade peers. . . . Thus, the educational program
offered to Student during his sixth and seventh grade years was not reasonably
calculated to allow Student to make appropriate progress under the
circumstances. At best, the District offered Student an educational program
promising de minimis academic progress. As such a program is insufficient,
there is no basis for overturning the Hearing Officer’s Decision.108

103. 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998).
104. P., 885 F.3d at 757.
105. No. 17-1523, 2017 WL 4548022, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2017).
106. Id. at *6.
107. T.M. v. Quakertown Cmty. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 792, 797 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
108. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.W., No. 3:16-CV-0381, 2017 WL 3971089, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8,

2017) (internal citations omitted).
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E. Fourth Circuit

In a case in which the FAPE standard was not at issue, the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that its FAPE standard was similar to the Tenth Circuit’s, which the
Supreme Court rejected in Endrew F.109 In a case in which the FAPE standard was
dispositive, a district court in the Fourth Circuit ruled that Endrew F. had overruled
Rowley.110
F. Fifth Circuit

In C.G. v. Waller Independent School District, the court equated its FAPE standard
with Endrew F.’s.111 The court below had applied the Fifth Circuit’s four-factor
FAPE analysis, which includes consideration of whether the IEP is individualized
based on the student’s assessments and academic performance and whether there are
demonstrative academic and non-academic benefits.112
G. Sixth Circuit

In Barney v. Akron Board of Education, a court in the Sixth Circuit stated that in
Endrew F., the Supreme Court “revised the Rowley standard for what qualifies as an
educational benefit” and that “an IEP would be judged as appropriate based on the
individual child’s potential.”113 Applying this standard, the court found that the
student was benefitting from individualized instruction and was making measurable
progress towards annual goals.114
H. Eighth Circuit

The Eighth Circuit referred to Endrew F. in a case involving a Minnesota statute,
but did not issue a ruling on the applicability of Endrew F. in the Eighth Circuit.115
A district court in the Eighth Circuit did address this issue, and found that Endrew

109. M.L. v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Our prior FAPE standard is similar to that of the

Tenth Circuit, which was overturned by Endrew F.”).

110. See J.R. v. Smith, No. DKC 16-1633, 2017 WL 3592453, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2017) (“[E]ven though

the ALJ made her decision prior to the Supreme Court’s articulation of the Endrew F. standard, she
went beyond the ‘more than de minimus’ [sic] standard . . . and laid out an approach that evaluated what
progress was appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances, just as Endrew F. requires.”).

111. 697 F. App’x 816, 819 (5th Cir. 2017).
112. Id.
113. No. 5:16CV0112, 2017 WL 4226875, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2017).
114. Id.
115. See I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Pub. Sch., 863 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2017).
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F. overruled the Eighth Circuit’s de minimis standard.116 Other district courts in the
Eighth Circuit have applied the Endrew F. standard as well.117
I. Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit’s response to Endrew F. has been inconsistent, but the weight
of authority in the Ninth Circuit is that Endrew F. replaced its “educational benefit”
FAPE standard. One decision ruled that Endrew F. clarified but did not overrule
Rowley and that the Ninth Circuit’s FAPE standard is consistent with Endrew F.118
On the other hand, three decisions explicitly adopted Endrew F. without addressing
whether it changed the Ninth Circuit’s FAPE standard.119 Two of these decisions
developed tests to determine whether a school district met Endrew F.’s FAPE
standard. In Rachel H., the court stated that Endrew F. requires an IEP team to
consider the child’s achievement levels, describe how the child’s disability affects the
child’s ability to perform, and set measurable goals.120 In M.C., the court interpreted
Endrew F. to require a school to “implement an IEP that is reasonably calculated to
remediate and, if appropriate, accommodate the child’s disabilities so that the child
can ‘make progress in the general education curriculum,’ taking into account the
progress of his non-disabled peers, and the child’s potential.”121
J. Tenth Circuit

On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court in Endrew F. articulated
the “new legal standard” for a FAPE: A child in a regular classroom should pass
from grade to grade; the IEP for a child not in the regular classroom should be
appropriately ambitious in light of the child’s circumstances; an IEP must enable the
child to make progress; and the progress must be appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.122 Applying this standard, the court ruled that the district failed to
provide Endrew F. a FAPE.123

116. See Paris Sch. Dist. v. A.H., No. 2:15-CV-02197, 2017 WL 1234151, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2017).
117. E.g., D.L. v. St. Louis City Pub. Sch. Dist., 326 F. Supp. 3d 810, 820–21 (E.D. Mo. July 2, 2018);

Albright v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-CV-3011, 2017 WL 2880853, at *2 (W.D. Ark. July
5, 2017).

118. See E.F. v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 726 F. App’x 535, 537 (9th Cir. 2018).
119. See J.M. v. Mayatoshi, 729 F. App’x 585, 586 (9th Cir. 2018); Rachel H. v. Dep’t of Educ., 868 F.3d

1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2017); M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1189, 1201 (9th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 556 (2017).

120. 868 F.3d at 1089.
121. 858 F.3d at 1201 (internal citations omitted).
122. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1181 (D. Col. Feb. 12, 2018).
123. Id. at 1186.
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K. Eleventh Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit has not yet addressed Endrew F., but a district court noted
the significant difference between its previous more than de minimis standard and
Endrew F.’s standard.124 Nonetheless, the court ruled that deference to the
administrative law judge’s decision issued under the previous standard was appropriate
as long as the legal implications of the findings were evaluated in accordance with
Endrew F.125
L. Post-Endrew F. Summary

The following chart summarizes the circuit courts’ responses to Rowley and
Endrew F. If a circuit is italicized, it means that the court of appeals has not yet
addressed the issue and the conclusion is based on a district court opinion. An asterisk
indicates that a circuit adopted the meaningful benefit standard post-Rowley, but after
Endrew F., articulated its standard by using Endrew F.’s appropriate progress language.
Circuit

Post-Rowley

Post-Endrew F.

District of Columbia

Some benefit

Appropriate progress

Second

Meaningful benefit

Meaningful benefit*

First

Third

Fourth
Fifth

Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth

Eleventh

Meaningful benefit
Meaningful benefit

Some/more than trivial benefit
Meaningful benefit

Meaningful benefit in light of
the child’s potential

Appropriate progress[?]
Meaningful benefit*

Appropriate progress
Meaningful benefit*

Appropriate progress

Some/more than trivial benefit

N/A

Benefit

Appropriate progress

Some/more than trivial benefit
Some/more than trivial benefit
Some/more than trivial benefit

Appropriate progress
Appropriate progress
Appropriate progress

This chart shows the pervasive impact of Endrew F. All of the circuits that had
adopted a FAPE standard requiring some or more than trivial benefit have adopted
the appropriate progress standard. The circuits that had adopted the meaningful
benefit standard have maintained that standard, but now phrase it in appropriate
progress terms.

124. See S.M. v. Hendry Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 2:14-cv-237-FtM-38CM, 2017 WL 4417070, at *2 (M.D. Fla.

Oct. 5, 2017).

125. Id.
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VII. DID ENDREW F. OPEN THE DOOR TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES?

Rowley closed the door for at least thirty-five years on the possibility of equal
educational opportunity for students with disabilities pursuant to the IDEA. Endrew
F. stated that the door remains closed, but an analysis of the meaning of equal
educational opportunity for children with disabilities—in conjunction with Endrew
F.’s own language and the tests that some courts have developed to implement it—
suggest that the next step in the evolution of the FAPE standard is equality of
educational opportunity.
The Constitution does not require our public schools to offer equal educational
opportunities to all students.126 The educational opportunities that are available
differ vastly among different school districts due to a number of factors, including
financial resources, demographics, and availability of teaching resources.127 In this
sense, the concept of equality of educational opportunity for children with disabilities
is an elusive one: Equal to what? Framed in the context of the IDEA’s purpose to
open the schoolhouse door to children with disabilities and provide them with an
appropriate education, and as described in Justice White’s dissent in Rowley, the
concept of equal educational opportunity in special education is a local one: Children
with disabilities should receive the same educational opportunity as typicallydeveloping children in their school.
In describing the FAPE standard for children whose disabilities make it unlikely
that they will be able to pass from grade to grade, the Court in Endrew F. stated, “The
goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet challenging
objectives.”128 This language plausibly describes the educational standard for public
education. Many school districts, regardless of their resource constraints, might already
be following this standard. All children, typically-developing and children with
disabilities alike, are entitled to an opportunity to meet challenging objectives, which,
by their very nature, are based on the capacity of the children to whom they apply.
District courts in the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted detailed
tests for determining if a child has received a FAPE, all of which move in the
direction of an equal educational opportunity standard. The Third and Fifth
Circuits’ tests generally require a school district to evaluate a child and determine her
potential, develop a program to make progress towards meeting that potential, and
measure the outcome.129 It is plausible that many public school districts already seek
to provide educational programs that help all students reach their potential. The
126. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
127. See Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach et al., Fourteen Economic Facts on Education and

Economic Opportunity 15 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
education_facts.pdf (explaining that state educational expenditures per student vary due to a state’s
relative wealth); Alice Yin, Education by the Numbers, N.Y. Times Mag. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/09/08/magazine/education-by-the-numbers.html (“Minority students are more
likely to be taught by inexperienced teachers . . . in thirty-three states.”).

128. 137 S. Ct. 988, 992 (2017).
129. See C.G. v. Waller Indep. Sch. Dist., 697 F. App’x 816, 819 (5th Cir. 2017); T.M. v. Quakertown Cmty.

Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 792, 797 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
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Ninth Circuit’s test explicitly adopts an equality test: It requires school districts to
offer children with disabilities an educational program that “is reasonably calculated
to remediate and, if appropriate, accommodate the child’s disabilities so that the
child can ‘make progress in the general education curriculum,’ . . . taking into account
the progress of his non-disabled peers, and the child’s potential.”130 This test could
be challenged as going beyond what Endrew F. allows, but perhaps it could withstand
scrutiny. It does not require equality but lists equality as one factor to consider.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Endrew F. is a landmark decision that will likely guide special education law for
the next two generations, as most circuit courts have already implemented its FAPE
standard. It also opens the door to requiring equal educational opportunity for
children with disabilities, a goal that Congress had for children when it passed the
IDEA more than forty years ago. Ultimately, the full potential of Endrew F. will be
realized with the continued dedication, commitment, and hard work of parents,
educators, advocates, and children, who bring the IDEA to life.

130. M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138

S. Ct. 556 (2017).
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